美国国家经济与安全审查委员会向国会提的26条建议:5G、台湾、朝鲜……

写完白宫幕僚专栏及其各自所把持的部门之后,笔者最近比较关注美中经济与安全审查委员会(USCC),发现它就像是美国处理与中国关系的一个中央处理器。它们每年都会出一个年报,从2002年至今,一年比一年厚,能感受到话语体系的变化。在2007年的报告中,笔者发现它就引用了纳瓦罗的研究成果,指出中国不公平竞争的5大武器,包括货币贬值、盗窃知识产权、环保条例比较宽松、出口补贴等也指出了中国没有遵守WTO规则。它们每年都会给国会提几十条建议,建议其给各个部门分配任务,调查相关问题。从现在的美国政策来看,多少都有体现。

本文是2018年年报,发表于2018年11月14日,分4章,共11个部分,全面评估了中美经济、贸易、国家安全、军事等方面的关系,还评估了中国与美国盟友、中国与亚太国家(如朝鲜等)、中国与台湾地区、中国与香港地区的关系,同时还有对中国国内推行的“一带一路”等计划的评估。在此基础上,它像国会提出了26条建议,建议国会指示或授权各部门之间加强协调,或开展某些新的评估项目,这些都是下一步工作的重点。

读2018年的报告,再配合中兴、晋华、华为等事件,心中非常不安,一方面用词非常“狠”,另一方面对技术,特别是5G、通信和物联网技术,要全面压制中国。所以,制裁可能仍在路上。

考虑到很少有读者能够耐心的读完这539页的英文报告,笔者将最核心的“建议”部分翻译总结如下,共各位读者参考(报告有个总结部分,可以去官网下载,地址:https://www.uscc.gov/Annual_Reports/2018-annual-report)。

Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations

美中经济与贸易关系

Section 2: Tools to Address U.S.-China Economic Challenges

处理美中经济挑战的工具

The Commission recommends:

委员会建议

1. Congress examine whether the Office ofthe U.S. Trade Representative should bring, in coordination with U.S. alliesand partners, a “non-violation nullification or impairment” case—alongside violationsof specific commitments—against China at the World Trade Organization underArticle 23(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

美国国会评估美国贸易代表办公室是否应与美国的盟友和伙伴协调,根据世界贸易组织《关税及贸易总协定》第23(b)条,对中国采取“不违反规定的撤销或损害”措施,并考察其是否违反某项具体承诺。

2. Congress direct the Office of the U.S.Trade Representative to identify the trade-distorting practices of Chinese state-owned enterprises and develop policies to counteract theiranticompetitive impact.

美国国会指示美国贸易代表办公室查明中国国有企业扭曲贸易的行为,并制定政策抵消这些行为的反竞争影响。(编者注:典型的就是“301”调查报告)

3. Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to conduct an assessment of U.S.-China collaborative initiatives in technical cooperation. This assessment should describe thenature of collaboration, including funding, participation, and reporting on theoutcomes; detail the licensing and regulatory regime under which theinitiatives occur; consider whether the intellectual property rights of U.S.researchers and companies are being adequately protected; examine whether Chinese state-owned enterprises or the military are benefitting from U.S.taxpayer-funded research; investigate if any Chinese researchers participating inthe collaboration have ties to the Chinese government or military; investigateif any U.S. companies, universities, or labs participating in U.S. government-led collaboration with China have been subject to cyber penetration originating in China; and evaluate the benefits of this collaboration for theUnited States. Further, this assessment should examine redundancies, if any,among various U.S.-China government-led collaborative programs, and make suggestions for improving collaboration.

国会指示政府问责局(Government Accountability Office)对中美技术合作的合作倡议进行评估。该评估应描述合作的性质,包括资助、参与者以及结果;详述有关措施所依据的许可及规管制度;考虑美国研究人员和公司的知识产权是否得到充分保护;研究中国国有企业或军队是否从美国纳税人资助的研究中受益调查参与合作的中国研究人员是否与中国政府或军方有联系调查参与美国政府主导的美中合作项目的任何美国公司、大学或实验室是否受到源自中国的网络渗透并评估这种合作对美国的好处。此外,这一评估还应调查由政府主导的美中合作项目是否存在浪费现象(冗余),如果有的话,并提出改进合作的建议。

Section 3: China’s Agricultural Policies: Trade, Investment, Safety, and Innovation.

中国的农业政策:贸易、投资、安全和创新

The Commission recommends:

委员会建议:

4. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofAgriculture to identify the extent to which China’s asynchronous biotech reviewand approval system for agricultural products adversely impacts U.S. industry.As part of its review, the U.S. Department of Agriculture should work with theOffice of the U.S. Trade Representative to seek bilateral or multilateralmeasures, as appropriate, to address these impacts.

美国国会指示美国农业部查明中国对农产品的非同步生物技术审查和批准制度对美国工业的不利影响程度。作为审查的一部分,美国农业部应与美国贸易代表办公室合作,寻求适当的双边或多边措施,以解决这些影响。

5. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofAgriculture, in collaboration with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, toprepare an annual report on its technical engagement with China on food safety, inspection, mechanisms foraddressing sanitary and phytosanitary problems, and any technical assistanceprovided to China to improve its food safety inspection regime.

国会指示美国农业部与美国食品和药物管理局合作,就其与中国在食品安全、检验、卫生和植物卫生问题处理机制方面的技术接触,以及为改进其食品安全检验制度而向中国提供的任何技术援助,编制一份年度报告。

Chapter 2: U.S.-China Security Relations

美中安全关系

Section 2: China’s Military Reorganization and Modernization: Implications for the United States.

中国的军事改组和现代化:对美国的启示

The Commission recommends:

委员会建议:

6. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofDefense and U.S. Department of Homeland Security to provide to the relevant committeesof jurisdiction a report, with a classified annex, assessing how the change in the China Coast Guard’scommand structure affects its status as a law enforcement entity now that itreports to the Central Military Commission. The report should discuss theimplications of this new structure for China’s use of the coast guard as acoercive tool in “gray zone” activity in the East and South China seas. Thisreport should also determine how this change may affect U.S. Navy andU.S. Coast Guard interactions with the China Coast Guard, and whether thelatter should be designated as a military force.

国会指示美国国防部和美国国土安全部,向有关权力部门提供报告(附保密附件),评估中国海警指挥机构的变动——直接向中央军事委员会报告——对其执法地位的影响。报告应讨论这种变化对中国在东海和南海“灰色地带”活动中使用海上保安厅作为强制性工具的影响。本报告还应确定这一变化可能如何影响美国海军和美国海岸警卫队与中国海岸警卫队的互动,以及中国海岸警卫队是否应被指定为一支军事力量。

7. Congress consider imposing sanctions onkey Chinese state-owned enterprises and individuals involved in China’s ongoingmilitarization of the South China Sea.

美国国会考虑对参与中国南海军事化进程的关键国有企业和个人实施制裁。

Chapter 3: China and the World

中国与世界

Section 1: Belt and Road Initiative

“一带一路”倡议

The Commission recommends:

委员会建议:

8. Congress create a fund to provide additional bilateral assistance for countries that are a target of orvulnerable to Chinese economic or diplomatic pressure, especially in theIndo-Pacific region. The fund should be used to promote digital connectivity, infrastructure,and energy access. The fund could also be used to promote sustainabledevelopment, combat corruption, promote transparency, improve rule of law,respond to humanitarian crises, and build the capacity of civil society and themedia.

美国国会设立了一个基金,为那些受到中国经济或外交压力的,或容易受到中国经济或外交压力影响的国家,特别是在印太地区,提供额外的双边援助。该基金应用于促进数字连接、基础设施和能源获取。该基金还可用于促进可持续发展、打击腐败、提高透明度、改善法治、应对人道主义危机以及建设公民社会和媒体的能力。

9. Congress require the U.S. Department ofState to prepare a report to Congress on the actions it is taking to provide analternative, fact-based narrative to counter Chinese messaging on the Belt andRoad Initiative (BRI). Such a report should also examine where BRI projectsfail to meet international standards and highlight the links between BRI andChina’s attempts to suppress information about and misrepresent reporting ofits human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

美国国会要求美国国务院就其正在采取的行动向国会提交一份报告,提供另一种基于事实的叙述,以对抗中国在“一带一路”倡议中传递的信息。此类报告还应审查“一带一路”项目在哪些方面不符合国际标准,并突出“一带一路”与中国试图掩盖新疆维吾尔族人权侵犯信息和歪曲报道之间的联系。

10. Congress require the Director of National Intelligence to produce a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), with aclassified annex, that details the impact of basing facilities along the Beltand Road on freedom of navigation and sea control, both in peacetime and duringa conflict. The NIE should cover the impact on U.S., allied, and regionalpolitical and security interests.

美国国会要求国家情报机关出具一份国家情报评估报告(NationalIntelligence Estimate, NIE),并附上一份机密附件,详细说明在和平时期和冲突时期,中国将“一带一路”沿线的设施建立在航行自由和海上控制基础上的影响。国家情报评估报告应该涵盖对美国、美国的盟国和地区的政治与安全利益。

Section 2: China’s Relations with U.S.Allies and Partners

中国与美国盟友与伙伴的关系

The Commission recommends:

委员会建议:

11. Congress direct the Administration tostrengthen cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners inEurope and the Indo-Pacific on shared economic and security interests andpolicies pertaining to China, including through the following measures:

国会指示政府加强美国及其在欧洲和印度-太平洋地区的盟友和伙伴在与中国有关的共同经济和安全利益及政策方面的合作,包括通过以下措施:

• Urge the Administration to engage inregular information sharing and joint monitoring of Chinese investment activities and to share best practices regarding screening of foreign investments with national security implications, including development ofcommon standards for screening mechanisms.

敦促政府对中国投资活动进行定期信息共享和联合监测并就涉及国家安全的外国投资筛选工作分享最佳做法,包括制定筛选机制的共同标准。

• Enhance consultations on mitigating theexport of dual-use technology to China and identifying other foundational technologies essential for national security.

加强在减少向中国出口军民两用技术和确定对国家安全至关重要的其他基础技术方面的磋商。

12. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofJustice to:

国会指示美国司法部

• Examine the application of current U.S.laws, including the “Conspiracy against Rights” law, toprosecuting Chinese Communist Party affiliates who threaten, coerce, orotherwise intimidate U.S. residents.

审查现行美国法律的适用情况,包括反阴谋法,以起诉威胁、胁迫或以其他方式恐吓美国居民的中国共产党附属机构。

• Clarify that labels required by theForeign Agents Registration Act on informational materials disseminated onbehalf of foreign principals, such as China Daily, must appear prominently atthe top of the first page of such materials.

明确《外国代理登记法》对代表外国委托人(如《中国日报》)传播的信息材料的标签,必须出现在这种材料首页上的显著位置。

13. Congress direct the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to produce an unclassified annualreport, with a classified annex, on the Chinese Communist Party’s influence andpropaganda activities in the United States.

美国国会指示美国国家反间谍和安全中心编制一份非机密年度报告,其中包含一份机密附件,内容涉及CCP在美国的影响力和宣传活动

14. Congress direct the Administration todiscuss in its engagements with the EU and NATO the implications of China’s increasingly close military ties with Russia and growing importance to transatlantic security interests. Such discussions would include how Europe and NATO canpromote the exchange of information on common defense and other challenges posed by China and Russia.

美国国会指示政府在与欧盟(EU)和北约(NATO)打交道时,讨论中国与俄罗斯日益密切的军事关系以及对跨大西洋安全利益日益重要的影响,这些讨论将包括欧洲和北约如何促进就共同防御以及中国和俄罗斯提出的其他挑战交换信息。

Section 3: China and Taiwan

中国与台湾

The Commission recommends:

委员会建议:

15. Congress direct the Office of the U.S.Trade Representative to resume meetings under the U.S.-Taiwan Trade andInvestment Framework Agreement in 2019 and to identify enhanced negotiating proceduresto resolve outstanding issues.

国会指示美国贸易代表办公室在美国国会授权下,重新开始2019年的《美台贸易投资框架协议》会议,并确定更高级的谈判程序,以解决悬而未决的问题。

16. Congress direct the Administration toproduce an interagency report on a whole-of-government strategy for supportingTaiwan’s engagement with the international community, including considerationof, but not limited to, the following actions:

美国国会指示政府就支持台湾参与国际社会的整体策略编制一份跨部门报告,包括考虑但不限于下列行动:

• Explore opportunities for providing proactive development and security assistance to Taiwan’s diplomatic partnersin an effort to encourage them to maintain ties with Taipei.

探索向台湾的外交伙伴提供积极发展和安全援助的机会,以鼓励他们与台北保持联系

•• Identify adjustments the United Statescould take in its relations with Taiwan in response to Beijing altering thecross- Strait status quo and taking coercive action to pressure Taipei.

找出美国可以与台湾关系做出的调整,以回应北京改变两岸现状并采取胁迫行动以向台湾施压。

• Discuss cross-Strait relations and U.S.policy regarding Taiwan in meetings with U.S. allied and partner governments andsupport an expansion of commercial, cultural, and other exchanges between Taiwan and those countries.

在与美国的盟国和伙伴政府的会议上讨论两岸关系和美国对台政策,支持扩大台湾与这些国家间的商业、文化和其他交流。

• Establish a high-level bilateralU.S.-Taiwan development dialogue to encourage Taiwan’s role in promoting sustainable global development.

建立高级别双边关系,支持台湾在促进全球可持续发展方面发挥作用。

17. Congress consider amending antiboycott laws under the Export Administration Act or pass new legislation to prohibitU.S. companies from complying with China’s efforts to apply pressure on Taiwan.Such legislation could include measures authorizing reciprocal sanctions on Chinese entities in the event of Chinese government retaliation against U.S.companies.

美国国会考虑根据《出口管理法》,修改反抵制法,或通过新的立法,禁止美国公司服从中国对台湾施加压力的努力。这类立法可能包括授权在中国政府报复美国公司的情况下对中国实体实施对等制裁的措施。

18. Congress direct the U.S. Department ofDefense to support the implementation of Taiwan’s new Overall Defense Conceptand take actions that support Taiwan’s ability to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability by including Taiwan military personnel as participants or observersin U.S. and U.S.-led multilateral military exercises; conducting regular high-level exchanges of military planning and other advisory personnel pursuantto the Taiwan Travel Act; and considering the potential for assisting Taiwanwith the creative acquisition of critical defense articles, including through coproduction of defense technology between U.S. and Taiwan companies.

美国国会指示美国国防部支持实施台湾新的整体防御理念,并采取行动支持台湾保持足够的自卫能力,将台湾军事人员作为参与者或观察员,包括在美国和美国领导的多边军事演习中;根据《台湾旅游法》,定期进行军事规划和其他咨询人员的高层交往;并考虑协助台湾创造性地获取关键防务用品的可能性,包括通过美国和台湾公司之间的防务技术合作。

19. Congress consider raising the threshold of congressional notification on sales of defense articles and services toTaiwan to those set for major U.S. allies, and terminating any requirement toprovide notification of maintenance and sustainment of Taiwan’s existingcapabilities.

美国国会考虑提高向美国主要盟国对台出售防务用品和服务的通报门槛,并终止对台湾现有军事设备进行维修或维护进行通报的任何要求。

20. Congress express support for the TsaiAdministration’s approach to maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

美国国会对蔡英文政府维持台湾海峡现状的做法表示支持

Section 5: China’s Evolving North KoreaStrategy

中国对朝鲜战略的演变

24. Congress direct the U.S. Department of the Treasury to provide a report within 180 days on the current state ofChinese enforcement of sanctions on North Korea. A classified annex shouldprovide a list of Chinese financial institutions, businesses, and officials involved in trading with North Korea that could be subject to future sanctions,and should explain the potential broader impacts of sanctioning those entities.

美国国会指示美国财政部在180天内就中国对朝鲜实施制裁的现状提交一份报告,并附一份机密附件,列出与朝鲜进行贸易的中国金融机构、企业和官员名单,这些机构、企业和官员未来可能会受到制裁,并应解释制裁这些实体可能产生的更广泛影响。

Chapter 4: China’s High-Tech Development

中国的高科技发展

The Commission recommends:

委员会建议:

25. Congress require the Office of Management and Budget’s Federal Chief Information Security Officer Council toprepare an annual report to Congress to ensure supply chain vulnerabilities from China are adequately addressed. This report should collect and assess:

国会要求管理和预算办公室的联邦首席信息安全委员会向国会提交一份年度报告,以确保来自中国的供应链漏洞得到充分解决。本报告应收集和评估:

• Each agency’s plans for supply chainrisk management and assessments;

每个机构的供应链风险管理和评估计划;

• Existing departmental procurement andsecurity policies and guidance on cybersecurity, operations security, physicalsecurity, information security and data security that may affect informationand communications technology, 5G networks, and Internet of Things devices; and

现有的可能影响信息通信技术、5G网络和物联网设备的网络安全、运营安全、物理安全、信息安全和数据安全方面的部门采购、安全政策和指导方针;和

• Areas where new policies and guidancemay be needed—including for specific information and communications technology, 5G networks, and Internet of Things devices, applications, or procedures—andwhere existing security policies and guidance can be updated to address supply chain, cyber, operations, physical, information, and data securityvulnerabilities.

指出哪些领域需要新的政策和指导方案——包括特定的信息和通信技术、5G网络、物联网设备、应用程序或流程——以及哪些领域现有的安全政策和指导方案可以更新,以解决供应链、网络、运营、物理、信息和数据安全漏洞。

26. Congress direct the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and Federal Communications Commission to identify (1) steps to ensure the rapid and secure deployment of a5G network, with a particular focus on the threat posed by equipment andservices designed or manufactured in China; and (2) whether any new statutoryauthorities are required to ensure the security of domestic 5G networks.

美国国会指示美国国家电信和信息管理局和联邦通信委员会确定:(1)确保5G网络的快速和安全部署的步骤,特别关注在中国设计或制造的设备和服务带来的威胁;(2)是否需要新的法定机构来保障国内5G网络的安全。

 

文章来源:修昔底德的回声 公众号 2018.12.08


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